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 ABSTRACT 
Organizations that run large computer networks should also provide maintenance 
for the computers on these networks. Nowadays, it is a common practice to outsource 
this maintenance task to specialized service firms.  
These service firms may not be considered trustworthy. Therefore, the local 
administrator password of a local machine that a maintenance technician needs to 
access should be changed periodically. Consequently, the technician needs a way to 
learn the current local administrator password of each computer. 
In this thesis, a secure password synchronization and querying system is 
presented. In this system, the local administrator passwords of computers are changed 
periodically in synchronization with a server managing the system. The maintenance 
technicians can learn the current password of a computer by querying the server. For 
synchronization and querying mechanisms, we propose three secure protocols that 
employ symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques. 
Moreover, in this thesis, the proposed protocols are implemented as a software 
product and the performance of the system is evaluated by simulating the system. The 
average of the number of successful synchronizations stays constant when the number 
of computers is increased from 3,000 to 20,000 in the simulation. An increase in the 
number of computers doesn’t change the behavior of the system. In addition, it is shown 
that the system can be configured to survive under rough network conditions. The 
implementation details and the performance evaluation of the system are presented in 
the thesis. 
 ÖZET 
Geniş bilgisayar ağları işleten organizasyonlar,  bu ağlardaki bilgisayarların 
bakımını sağlamalıdırlar. Son zamanlarda, bu bakım işini uzman servis firmalarına 
devretmek genel bir iş pratiği haline gelmiştir. 
Servis firmaları güvenilir bulunmayabilir. Bu yüzden bakım teknisyeninin bilmesi 
gereken yerel bilgisayarların yönetici şifreleri periyodik olarak değiştirilmelidir. Ayrıca, 
teknisyenin bir bilgisayarın mevcut yerel yönetici şifresini öğrenmesinin bir yolu 
olmalıdır. 
Bu tezde, güvenli bir şifre senkronizasyonu ve sorgulama sistemi sunulmaktadır. 
Bu sistemde, bilgisayarların yerel yönetici şifreleri, sistemi idare eden bir sunucu ile 
senkronizasyon içinde belli aralıklarla değiştirilmektedir. Teknisyenler, bir bilgisayarın 
mevcut şifresini sunucuyu sorgulayarak öğrenebilirler. Senkronizasyon ve sorgulama 
mekanizmaları için simetrik ve asimetrik şifreleme tekniklerinin kullanıldığı üç güvenli 
protokol önermekteyiz.  
Bu tezde önerilen protokoller bir yazılım ürünü olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. 
Ortalama başarılı senkronizasyon sayısı, bilgisayar sayısı 3.000’den 20.000’e 
artırıldığında sabit kalmaktadır. Sistemin davranışı, bilgisayar sayısındaki artıştan 
etkilenmemektedir. Ayrıca, sistemin kötü ağ koşullarına rağmen çalışmaya devam 
edecek şekilde ayarlanabileceği de gösterilmiştir. Uygulama detayları ve sistemin 
performans değerlendirilmesi  bu tezde sunulmuştur. 
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 ABSTRACT 
Organizations that run large computer networks should also provide maintenance 
for the computers on these networks. Nowadays, it is a common practice to outsource 
this maintenance task to specialized service firms.  
These service firms may not be considered trustworthy. Therefore, the local 
administrator password of a local machine that a maintenance technician needs to 
access should be changed periodically. Consequently, the technician needs a way to 
learn the current local administrator password of each computer. 
In this thesis, a secure password synchronization and querying system is 
presented. In this system, the local administrator passwords of computers are changed 
periodically in synchronization with a server managing the system. The maintenance 
technicians can learn the current password of a computer by querying the server. For 
synchronization and querying mechanisms, we propose three secure protocols that 
employ symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques. 
Moreover, in this thesis, the proposed protocols are implemented as a software 
product and the performance of the system is evaluated by simulating the system. The 
average of the number of successful synchronizations stays constant when the number 
of computers is increased from 3,000 to 20,000 in the simulation. An increase in the 
number of computers doesn’t change the behavior of the system. In addition, it is shown 
that the system can be configured to survive under rough network conditions. The 
implementation details and the performance evaluation of the system are presented in 
the thesis. 
 ÖZET 
Geniş bilgisayar ağları işleten organizasyonlar,  bu ağlardaki bilgisayarların 
bakımını sağlamalıdırlar. Son zamanlarda, bu bakım işini uzman servis firmalarına 
devretmek genel bir iş pratiği haline gelmiştir. 
Servis firmaları güvenilir bulunmayabilir. Bu yüzden bakım teknisyeninin bilmesi 
gereken yerel bilgisayarların yönetici şifreleri periyodik olarak değiştirilmelidir. Ayrıca, 
teknisyenin bir bilgisayarın mevcut yerel yönetici şifresini öğrenmesinin bir yolu 
olmalıdır. 
Bu tezde, güvenli bir şifre senkronizasyonu ve sorgulama sistemi sunulmaktadır. 
Bu sistemde, bilgisayarların yerel yönetici şifreleri, sistemi idare eden bir sunucu ile 
senkronizasyon içinde belli aralıklarla değiştirilmektedir. Teknisyenler, bir bilgisayarın 
mevcut şifresini sunucuyu sorgulayarak öğrenebilirler. Senkronizasyon ve sorgulama 
mekanizmaları için simetrik ve asimetrik şifreleme tekniklerinin kullanıldığı üç güvenli 
protokol önermekteyiz.  
Bu tezde önerilen protokoller bir yazılım ürünü olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. 
Ortalama başarılı senkronizasyon sayısı, bilgisayar sayısı 3.000’den 20.000’e 
artırıldığında sabit kalmaktadır. Sistemin davranışı, bilgisayar sayısındaki artıştan 
etkilenmemektedir. Ayrıca, sistemin kötü ağ koşullarına rağmen çalışmaya devam 
edecek şekilde ayarlanabileceği de gösterilmiştir. Uygulama detayları ve sistemin 
performans değerlendirilmesi  bu tezde sunulmuştur. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The amount of information shared over computer networks is increasing 
enormously as the sizes of computer networks increase and more business is carried out 
electronically. The organizations use computers much more than the past in order to 
increase their effectiveness.  
Today, numerous big or even mid-sized organizations have computer networks 
with thousands of computers, which we will mention as Enterprise Networks throughout 
the thesis. As the computer becomes an inextricable part of businesses, organizations do 
not tolerate failures in their computer systems. Therefore, maintenance of computer 
systems and shortening repair time upon a failure are vital issues for organizations.  
Some organizations carry out the maintenance of their computer systems by their 
IT departments, whereas others prefer outsourcing this task because of the following 
reasons: 
o Outsourcing helps organizations to reduce costs and to focus on their core 
businesses. 
o Since fast and accurate solutions are required in maintenance of a computer 
system, a specialized service firm is a better alternative than an IT department. 
In order to carry out maintenance operations on a particular computer, a 
maintenance technician needs to gain administrative rights by using local administrative 
account credentials. Generally, the same username and password are used for each 
computer or a group of computers in the network to help the maintenance staff to easily 
recall the password for all computers. IT departments may be considered trustworthy 
whereas a service firm may not. Here lies the crucial requirement: The local 
administrative account username and password of a computer in the enterprise network 
  2 
must be changed periodically in order to prevent long-term hazards in case of a 
compromise. However, the maintenance technician still needs to know the current local 
administrator account username and password. 
We propose a secure password synchronization, management, and querying 
system, called Enterprise-Level Sensitive Information Security System (ESIS). Local 
administrator passwords are very sensitive information in an enterprise network, but 
there may be other types of information as sensitive as the local administrator password 
and must be secured. Therefore, we have chosen the term, “Sensitive Information” in 
naming our system in order to cover all types of sensitive information including the 
“local administrator password”. Although we focus only on administrator passwords, 
the proposed security protocols can easily be utilized in exchange and synchronization 
of other types of sensitive information, as well. 
The local administrator passwords are changed periodically under the control of a 
server and in a synchronized fashion. Additionally, a maintenance technician can query 
the server to learn the current password of a computer in the network. The password 
synchronization and querying facility are provided by the following secure protocols 
that have been designed in the scope of this thesis: 
o ESIS Secure Synchronization Protocol (ESSP) 
o ESIS Client Initialization Protocol (ECIP) 
o ESIS Secure Querying Protocol (ESQP) 
In Section 2, the necessary background information about cryptography and 
security is given in order to clarify the details of the protocols. The overview of the 
proposed system and the secure protocols that the system depends on are detailed in 
Section 3. Details of the prototype that has been developed in order to implement the 
solution are given  Section 4, and finally the performance evaluation of the system are 
detailed in Section 5. 
  3 
2 BACKGROUND 
Identification of users in a computer network is crucial. Consider a large 
enterprise network where so many computers and electronic devices are inter-connected 
to each other. In such a network, there are so many remote services provided such as 
printing, file sharing, remote access, etc. Only authorized users can use these services. 
For instance, when a user wants to check out his/her e-mails, he/she logs in by typing 
his/her username and password in the login form. If this information is correct, which 
means that the e-mail server authenticates the user as a result of successful matching of 
the entered username and password and the ones in the user database, he/she gets 
authorized to use the e-mail service. In fact, authorization and authentication are two 
separate concepts, but they are very close to each other in most applications. 
Authentication is the process of confirming the correctness of the claimed identity. 
Authorization is the approval, permission, or empowerment for someone or something 
to do something. Authentication is often a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in 
the system, i.e. for authorization. 
2.1 Cryptography Basics 
Authentication protocols and systems are based on cryptographic primitives such 
as encryption and hashing algorithms.  In the ESIS System, we have used symmetric 
and asymmetric encryption, code obfuscation techniques as well as message 
authentication codes and hash functions. In this subsection, we briefly discuss these 
primitives. 
  4 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Cryptography is the art of making messages secret, so anyone who intercepts the 
message cannot understand it. Cryptanalysis is the art of breaking ciphertext by using 
special methods. Cryptology is the study of mathematical building blocks of 
cryptanalysis and cryptography. Cryptography deals with cryptosystems in which 
messages are encrypted and decrypted. 
Encryption is the process of converting a message into an encoded form in order 
to hide the content from outsiders. The original message is described as plaintext or 
cleartext in cryptography terminology. The encrypted message is called ciphertext. 
Decryption is the reverse of encryption process. It converts ciphertext to plaintext.  
Generally in encryption and decryption processes, a key is used. A ciphertext which is 
encrypted by an encryption key cannot be decrypted without knowing the decryption 
key. The details of these encryption algorithms will be given later in this chapter. In 
Figure 2.1, encryption and decryption processes are depicted. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Encryption and decryption  
 
Encryption/Decryption algorithms are split into two categories:  
o Symmetric (secret-key) algorithms  
o Asymmetric (public-key) algorithms 
  
  5 
2.1.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
 In symmetric cryptographic algorithms, the same secret key is used in encryption 
and decryption processes. Today’s symmetric algorithms work on blocks of data or one 
bit at a time. They are called block ciphers and stream ciphers, respectively.  
The most widely used symmetric block cipher is DES (Data Encryption Standard) 
[1]. It was published by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) first in 
1977. Until 2000’s, DES was the standard for symmetric encryption. DES operates on 
64-bit blocks and its key length is 56. DES has been proved as a secure algorithm as 
more study has been done on it.  
With the increase in computational power of computers, DES key length became 
too small to resist against brute-force attacks. In 1999, NIST published FIPS 46-3 [1] 
which is the new version of DES standard. In this standard, it was recommended that 
old version of DES should only be used in legacy systems. In the new systems, instead 
of DES, 3DES (triple DES) is recommended. 3DES utilizes DES algorithm and runs it 
three times in a row. It is resistant to cryptanalysis and it has a key length of 112-bit or 
168-bit. However, 3DES is slow in software (DES was designed primarily for 
hardware) and its block length is 64 (Larger block size would be more secure). 
Therefore, NIST has decided to replace this standard.  
In 1997, NIST started a contest by issuing a call for proposals for the new 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). NIST selected the Rijndael algorithm which was 
developed by Dr. Joan Daemen and Dr. Vincent Rijmen. In November 2001, with the 
publication of FIPS PUB 197 [2], AES became the new standard symmetric encryption 
algorithm. Rijndael or AES algorithm has the following characteristics as described in 
[3]: 
o Very resistant against all known attacks 
o High speed on various platforms 
o Simple design 
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The AES algorithm is a block cipher algorithm which operates on 128, 192 or 
256-bit blocks. Three different-sized symmetric keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits are used. 
The AES algorithm involves, r standard rounds (r may be 10, 12 or 14 depending on the 
block and key lengths). The relation between the number of rounds and key length is 
shown in Table 2.1. The details of the AES algorithm can be found in [2]. 
Key Length (in bits) Number of rounds (r) 
128 10 
192 12 
256 14 
Table 2.1. Key lengths and number of rounds in AES 
In ESIS, AES is employed in the synchronization and querying protocols as the 
symmetric encryption algorithm. The AES key length is 128 bits in ESIS. 
2.1.3 Public Key Cryptography 
The idea of public key cryptography has been first proposed in the seminal paper 
of Diffie and Hellman [4]. In public key cryptography, there is no shared secret key 
between two parties, which is the main difference between public key cryptography and 
symmetric key cryptography. In a public key cryptography based system, each principal 
has its own public key and private key pair. Public key can be obtained by all of the 
principals in the system whereas private key is just known by its owner and secret. A 
message encrypted by using public key can only be decrypted by private key, which 
provides secrecy of the message. The opposite situation is also valid. A message 
encrypted by using private key can only be decrypted by public key, which provides 
authenticity of the message, because only the owner of the private key can encrypt the 
message. 
The most widely known public key algorithm is RSA which was developed by 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [5]. In RSA, encryption and decryption are the same 
processes. The strength of RSA depends on the computational infeasibility of 
factorization of large numbers. The factorization of large numbers is a complex and 
hard problem, but continuing increase in computing power and refinement of factoring 
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algorithms decreases the amount of duration required to crack RSA. In the near future, 
key  lengths of 1024-bit and 2048-bit seem reasonably sufficient as discussed in [3].  
In ESIS, RSA is employed in the secure querying protocol. A session key is 
shared between two parties by using RSA encryption and decryption techniques. 
Moreover, RSA private key encryption and a hash function are used together to digitally 
sign technician’s password stored in his/her token. 
2.1.4 Cryptographic Hash Functions 
 A cryptographic hash function is an algorithm that computes a value based on a 
data object thereby mapping the data object to a smaller thumbprint as mentioned in [6]. 
To explain in more detail, a cryptographic hash function computes a fixed-size data 
from a message and this fixed-size data, which is called message digest, must have the 
following properties: 
1. One-way: It must be computationally infeasible to compute the message from the 
message digest. 
2. Weak collision resistance: It must be computationally infeasible to find another 
message that yields the same digest with a given message when it is hashed. 
3. Strong collision resistance: It must be computationally infeasible to find a pair of 
messages that yields the same message digests. 
Some of standard hash functions are SHA-1 [7] and RipeMD-160 [8]. Hash 
functions are used in a variety of applications. The followings are some of these 
applications: 
o Message Authentication Code (MAC): In constructing a message authentication 
code, hash functions are used. 
o Digital Signature: In order to digitally sign a large document, it is hashed at first 
and the digest is signed for performance results. 
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o Timestamps: A timestamp is included in a message digest in order to know when 
the corresponding hashed document has been signed. 
o Virus Checking: Digest of an unmodified version of a file can be used in order to 
reveal that this file can be infected by a virus or modified by comparing the 
digest of the possible infected file. 
o Securing Passwords: In the password based authentication systems, digests of 
passwords are stored in a file or a database, so that a hacker cannot learn the 
passwords by just obtaining a copy of the password file or database.  
In the ESIS System, hash functions are used in the protocols in order to create 
message authentication codes and to store thumbprints of passwords.  
2.1.5 Digital Signatures 
Public-key algorithms can be utilized to create digital signatures. A digital 
signature is a piece of data that is generated using a private key on a message. The 
corresponding public key is used to verify this signature on a message. The signature is 
also used to check the integrity of the message. 
Another purpose of using digital signatures is to build a relationship between a 
public key and its owner. Owner's information and public key are digitally signed by a 
trusted authority. The resulting signed document is called a certificate. Certificates are 
verified to learn third party’s public keys in an authentic way. A third party key learnt in 
this way is trusted because it's signed by a trusted authority.  
There are three important standard algorithms for generation and verification of 
digital signatures: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [9], RSA [5], and Elliptic Curve 
DSA (ECDSA) [10]. 
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2.1.6 Message Authentication Code 
A message authentication code reduces a message to a fixed small block of data 
but it brings the notion of using a secret key. MAC functions are as fast as hash 
functions and in general a MAC function is irreversible like a hash function. In an 
authentication system, the MAC is appended to the message to provide integrity and 
authentication.  
Hash-based MAC (HMAC) [11] is used in order to generate message 
authentication codes. In the secure protocols of the ESIS System, the participants that 
have the same symmetric key use HMAC function in order to authenticate the protocol 
messages.  
2.1.7 Cryptographic Random Number Generators  
Cryptographic Random Number Generators (RNGs) are used to generate random 
number sequences to be used in cryptographic applications. Some examples are listed 
below: 
o In some key distribution systems, nonces are used to prevent replay attacks. 
Nonces are sent to the recipient as a part of the message. Since they are random 
numbers, the sent message cannot be replayed.  
o In authentication protocols, session key generation is carried out by using a 
random number generator. 
o RSA public-key encryption uses random number generators in order to generate 
the public and private key pair. 
The ESIS System make use of RNGs in order to generate random binary 
sequences. These binary sequences are used in the generation of new passwords and 
timestamps. 
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They are different from normal random number generators which are available in 
many programming languages or operating systems in terms of high resistance to 
cryptanalysis. They can be used to generate cryptographic keys. 
In the ideal case, random numbers are based on truly random sources such as 
physical noise generators, the most significant bits of an audio input or keystrokes on a 
computer keyboard. But in cryptographic applications, such sources are often 
unavailable. Therefore, pseudo-random numbers are used instead of truly random 
numbers.  Pseudo-random numbers are outcomes of deterministic algorithms and not 
statistically random but they are successfully tested to verify that they are close to true 
randomness. Despite the determinism in their calculation, they are useful as it is stated 
in [12]: 
For practical purposes we are forced to accept the awkward concept of 
"relatively random" meaning that with regard to the proposed use we can see no 
reason why they will not perform as if they were random (as the theory usually 
requires.). This is highly subjective and is not very palatable to purists, but it is 
what statisticians regularly appeal to when they take "a random sample" - they 
hope that any results they use will have approximately the same properties as a 
complete counting of the whole sample space that occurs in their theory. 
2.2 Authentication 
Authentication is the process of determining whether a participant’s identity is 
correct. In computer systems, participants are allowed to use resources after they are 
authenticated.  
We can differentiate between two types of authentication: machine-by-machine 
authentication (machine authentication) and human-by-machine authentication (user 
authentication) as discussed in [13]. These two types of authentication are depicted in 
Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.2. User authentication and machine authentication 
Machine authentication is securer than user authentication. In machine 
authentication, two machines use strong encryption algorithms with long and 
unpredictable encryption keys in message exchange, so it is infeasible for a malicious 
person to crack the message exchange between them. However, in user authentication a 
person uses a password instead of a long key because he/she cannot remember a long 
sequence of bits. This password is then converted into a sequence of bits by applying a 
hash function. The result of this function is again unpredictable for a human but the 
password is not. People tend to choose passwords that may be guessed easily as 
described in [14]. Therefore, user authentication is the weakest link in the whole 
authentication chain. 
2.2.1 Authenticator Types 
Before the Internet usage wasn’t wide-spread as it is today and computers were 
generally single working machines and not connected to a network, people had to 
remember a single password to login to their computers. But with the rise of Internet 
and the computer systems and applications based on TCP-IP networking, number of 
passwords that a person possesses has increased as well. The most of the user 
authentication systems depend solely on password-usage. The password is the simplest 
but the most widely used way of user authentication but it has drawbacks and security 
risks. There are other types of user authentication methods which are harder to 
implement but securer than passwords. These are biometric and token based methods. 
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In [13], authenticators illustrated in Figure 2.3 are categorized as follows: 
1. Knowledge-Based Authenticators (What You Know): A knowledge-based 
authenticator is a secret phrase or a single secret word. A memorized password 
is an example to this type of authenticator. 
2.  Object-based Authenticators (What You Have): Object-based authenticators 
are physically owned things such as specially designed temper-resistant digital 
tokens or smart cards.  
3. ID-based Authenticators (Who You Are): ID-based authenticators are unique to 
one person, so that they can identify their owners. Biometrics such as 
fingerprint, signature or eye scan are in this category. 
 
 Figure 2.3. User authentication is split into three categories 
The password. The most widely used way of authentication is the password [15]. 
The term password means a personal identification number (PIN), a phrase or a single 
word. Although it is a very convenient authenticator, it is the least secure way of user 
authentication and this has proven by the studies [14, 16, 17, 18]. 
It is obvious that password-based authentication systems include security risks 
and threats. Because of the risks in password-based authentication systems, NIST have 
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published a document [19] including guidelines identifying 10 characteristics in 
designing a password system. Some of the characteristics are as follows: 
o length 
o character set 
o lifetime 
o source, i.e. user or administrator generated 
o ownership, preferably individual 
o distribution 
o storage 
o entry e.g. keyboard, display, possibility of being overlooked 
o etc. 
Other Authenticators. A token is a device that you have in an authentication 
process and performs the authentication. It can be a smart card, a USB memory stick or 
your credit card. The token simply defines the object-based authenticators. Your 
possession of the token gets you authenticated.  
A biometric is a feature of your body that can distinguish you from other people. 
Biometrics include fingerprint, iris, retina, face, voice, and hand. A biometric shows 
who you are with no doubt so that non-repudiation never occurs.  
Object-based (token) and id-based (biometric) authenticators are more secure in 
some conditions but sometimes they are not as feasible as the password for some 
conditions, too. In every use of a password, it gets more insecure to use it. You can lose 
your digital token. A biometric is difficult to replace (you cannot replace your eye). 
Also, as shown in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 [13], every authenticator has its own security 
risks in certain circumstances. 
Every authenticator has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, it 
may not be convenient or feasible to implement a token or biometric based computer 
  14 
login system for every user in a large corporate network. Such a system requires a 
substantial initial investment for the electronic devices such as smart cards, smart card 
readers, digital tokens or biometric reader devices for every workstation in the network. 
The total cost includes not only this initial investment but also the constant maintenance 
and administrative costs. 
Attacks Authenticators Examples Typical Defenses 
Password Guessing, exhaustive search Large Entropy; limited attempts 
Token Exhaustive search Large entropy; limited attempts, theft 
of object requires  
Client Attack 
Biometric False match Large entropy; limited attempts 
Password Plaintext theft, 
dictionary/exhaustive search 
Hashing; large entropy; protection of 
password database 
Token Passcode theft 1-time passcode for each session 
Host Attack 
Biometric Template theft Capture device authentication 
Password Shoulder surfing User diligence to keep secret; 
administrator diligence to quickly 
revoke compromised passwords; 
multi-factor authentication 
Token Theft, counterfeiting 
hardware 
Multi-factor authentication; tamper 
resistant/evident hardware token 
Eaves-dropping, 
Theft and Copying 
Biometric Copying biometric Copy-detection at capture device ad 
capture device authentication 
Password Replay stolen password 
response 
Challenge-response protocol 
Token Replay stolen passcode 
response 
Challenge-response protocol; 1-time 
passcode per session 
Replay 
Biometric Replay stolen biometric 
template response 
Copy-detection at capture device and 
capture device authentication via 
challenge-response protocol 
Trojan Horse Password, token, 
biometric 
Installation of rogue client or 
capture device 
Authentication of client or capture 
device; client or capture device within 
trusted security perimeter 
Denial of Service Password, token, 
biometric 
Lockout by multiple failed 
authentications 
Multi-factor with token 
Table 2.2. Some potential attacks on authenticators 
In the real life, while designing a security system process, the choice of the 
authentication system depends on the cost, convenience and the required security level 
of the system. It can easily be claimed that cost and security level are directly 
proportional whereas  security level and convenience are inversely proportional [20]. 
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Security Issues Authenticators Examples Typical Defenses 
Password, token Claim lost or stolen 
authenticator 
Personal liability, two-factor 
with biometric (e.g. 
signature) 
Non-repudiation 
Biometric Claim copied 
biometric 
Capture device 
authentication 
Password, 
biometric 
Stolen password or 
copied biometric 
“Last login” displayed to 
user to detect anomaly 
Compromise Detection 
Token Lost or stolen token User notes physical absence 
Password Initial password 
registration 
Delivery to pre-established 
e-mail address 
Token New token 
registration 
Delivery to pre-established 
physical address 
Administrative and 
Policy-
Registration/Enrollment 
Biometric Biometric enrollment In-person with picture ID 
Password Forgotten password Secondary authenticator 
(e.g., date of birth) 
Token Lost token Delivery to pre-established 
physical address 
Administrative and 
Policy-Reset and 
Recovery 
Biometric Compromised 
biometric 
Not much option but to 
revert to password 
Table 2.3. Other security issues about authenticators 
Multi-factor Authenticators. These three types of authenticators can be used 
together to increase the security level of the authentication system. For example, a bank 
credit card cannot be used to withdraw money from an ATM machine without knowing 
the corresponding password. In Table 2.4 [13], the security advantages and drawbacks 
of combining authenticators are shown.  
Authenticator 
Combination 
Security Advantage Convenience 
Drawback 
Example 
Knowledge- 
and Object- 
Based 
Lost/stolen token 
protected by password 
Must carry token and 
memorize password 
PIN-enabled bank card 
Object- and 
ID- Based 
Lost/stolen token 
protected by ID 
Must carry token, but 
not ID if it is a 
biometric 
Photo-ID 
Knowledge- 
and ID-Based 
Two factors provide 
security in case either 
compromised 
Have to memorize 
password and have ID 
Password and biometric 
for computer access 
Knowledge-, 
Object-, and 
ID- Based 
A third factor to 
provide security in case 
two other factors are 
compromised 
Have to memorize 
password, carry token, 
and have ID 
Military applications 
requiring photo-ID 
checked by guard, plus 
password 
Table 2.4. Combining authenticators 
One of the authentication protocols developed in the scope of this study relies on 
the knowledge and object based multi-factor authenticator. Knowledge-based 
authenticator is a username-password combination whereas object-based authenticator 
is a token. These authenticators are mutually dependent to each other because they 
should be used together in authentication.  
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In our study, each username in the authentication system is unique. Moreover, a 
unique binary string is stored in every user’s token. There is a one-to-one relationship 
between usernames and binary strings in the tokens. The combination of the binary 
string, the username, and the password represent an individual principal in the 
authentication system. Therefore, compromise of one authenticator is not sufficient to 
break the system. Also, we have designed this unique string to be an encrypted form of 
the digest of the user’s password. This design choice has the following advantages: 
o Even if a hacker steals a token, the password cannot be extracted out of the token 
since it is hashed. 
o Even if a hacker manages to create a new user account (a username and a 
password) in the system, he will still need a token to authenticate 
himself/herself, which is practically impossible. A hacker cannot produce this 
binary string corresponding to this password, because the digest is encrypted 
with the server’s private key. 
o If a user loses his/her token, replacing the corresponding password with a new one 
and giving the user another token carrying the encrypted form of the new digest 
thwarts a hacker who will try to use the lost token when he gets the related 
password. 
2.3 Code Obfuscation 
The word obfuscate means “to confuse”. Code Obfuscation refers to confusing the 
program code. In other words, Code Obfuscation is the technical term for preventing 
others from reading the code. Obfuscation serves to increase the difficulty of 
decompilation, usually forcing someone who wants that information to use more costly 
forms of reverse engineering. 
The idea of code obfuscation is to transform the program code in order to make it 
more difficult to understand without changing the functionality the program provides. 
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Security of obfuscation relies on sophistication of transformation, power of 
deobfuscation algorithms and resources available to deobfuscator.  
The code obfuscation methods are categorized as follows: 
o Layout Obfuscation: Aimed at making the code unreadable 
o Data Obfuscation: Aimed at obscuring data and data structures like migrate 
storage, aggregation, ordering and encoding. 
o Control Flow Obfuscation: Aimed at obfuscating the flow of execution which 
makes code more frustrating 
o Preventive Transformation: This transformation type intends to stop 
decompilers and deobfuscators from working. 
The advantages provided by code obfuscation methods are as follows: 
o Code obfuscation preserves platform independency to an extent unlike most of 
other source code protecting techniques. The obfuscated program is packaged 
with an obfuscator program that can run the obfuscated application in different 
versions of a particular operating system. 
o The obfuscator program also compresses the obfuscated application, which 
results in a smaller-sized application. Therefore, an obfuscated program can be 
downloaded faster on a network. 
o Since the obfuscator program also encrypts the obfuscated application, there is 
no need to a specific hardware for encryption. 
The followings are the disadvantages of code obfuscation: 
o Since the obfuscated application should be deobfuscated before it is executed, 
the execution time of the application increases. 
o Obfuscating a program needs special complex tools that are difficult to use. 
o The program development effort increases when a code obfuscation phase is 
integrated into the programming development cycle. 
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o Since code obfuscation techniques use complex algorithms, more processing 
power may be needed in order to use these techniques. 
In the ESIS System, the client application is obfuscated in order to prevent 
attackers to learn the hidden seed value. The use of this seed value is described in 
Section 3.3.2. 
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3 THE DESIGN OF THE ESIS SYSTEM 
In this chapter, we propose a secure synchronization system as a solution to the 
problem of managing local administrator passwords in an enterprise network. The 
problem is defined in Section 3.1. An overview of the proposed system is given in 
Section 3.2. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 , we describe the details of the system. We propose 
three secure protocols in Section 3.5, which constitute the base of the proposed system.  
3.1 Problem Definition 
A large enterprise computer network may consist of thousands of computers and 
may be formed of subnetworks that may be geographically separated. The maintenance 
of such a large network requires a work force specialized on computer hardware and 
software.  Some companies in public and private sectors carry out maintenance work by 
in-house IT departments established for this purpose, whereas some other companies 
and organizations outsource this work to computer support and maintenance firms that 
have more experience in this field. Companies and organizations outsource their 
maintenance tasks in order to focus on their core businesses and to decrease their 
operational costs.  
Maintenance of a distributed enterprise computer network involves the following 
operations: 
o Configuration of network equipments such as routers, switches. 
o Installation, configuration, and repair of operating systems, database, email 
servers, and other software 
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o Installation, configuration, and repairing computer peripherals such as 
modems, ethernet or video cards, etc. 
In order to carry out maintenance operations specific to a computer, a 
maintenance technician needs to gain administrative rights by using administrative 
account credentials. In Windows operating systems (Win NT, Win2000, WinXP), an 
administrative account can be a local or a domain1 account. A local administrator 
account can only be used for a computer but a domain administrative account has 
administrative access to all of the computers in the domain.  
The username and password in encoded forms of the local administrator account 
are stored in the local computer, whereas domain account information is stored in a 
central domain server. In many cases, the technician needs the local administrator 
password because domain passwords cannot be verified against the domain server if the 
computer is not connected to the network. There might be different policies about the 
maintenance of local administrator passwords. 
Every computer may be assigned a different random local administrator password. 
This method would prevent the whole network from being compromised when only one 
local administrator password has been revealed. However, it is practically impossible 
for a technician to memorize and recall all of the passwords of the computers in an 
enterprise network. Therefore, a technician will need to carry a list of the computers and 
their corresponding local administrator passwords on either paper or digital media. 
Changes in the local administrator passwords should be reflected to every technician’s 
list. On the other hand, a static list of passwords would be very insecure as stated in 
[21].  
Another method is to group the computers into a few numbers (the group size may 
be between 3 and 7 computers, depending on the network size) of groups and every 
group can be assigned a different local administrator password. As a result, the number 
                                                
1 A Windows Domain is a logical grouping of computers that share common security and user account 
information. This information is stored in a master directory database (SAM) which resides on a 
Windows server designated as a domain controller. 
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of passwords a technician should recall is decreased to a level where every technician 
can remember the passwords easily. Although this method is quite convenient and 
feasible, compromise of a group password results in compromise of all the computers in 
that group. 
A more convenient, but very insecure, method would be assigning a unique 
password or generic passwords generated by using a simple rule to the computers. The 
generic password may be generated by adding the first three characters of the computer 
name at the end of a constant string such as “clientpwd”. However, compromise of the 
unique password or the rule used in generating a password results in the compromise of 
all the computers. 
Methods described above are usually implemented in organizations lacking a 
secure automation system that periodically updates passwords and provide a query 
interface to technicians to obtain the current local administrator password of a 
computer. Such organizations encounter the following security risks when they 
outsource computer maintenance: 
o Technicians are authorized users that can perform every operation on the 
computers without being tracked. Since technicians use the same local 
administrator account to login a specific computer and there is no relation 
between a technician and a local administrator account, activity log recorded by 
the operating system of the computer cannot be used for tracking technicians. 
o  There is a common business fact that secret information for an organization must 
not be known by outsiders. Technicians working for the computer support firm 
may change frequently due to the job rotation in the service firm. Therefore, 
local administrator passwords should be changed according to the change in the 
technician staff, which is a difficult and tedious operation to perform in an 
enterprise network.  
o Passwords cannot be changed instantly when a technician quits his/her job.  
o Technicians may use memory aids (a note paper, a PDA) to remember the 
passwords. A memory aid can be lost or stolen which prevents all of the 
passwords from being secret. 
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o By the use of social engineering techniques as described in [22], a hacker may 
obtain the passwords and use these passwords until they expire. Since passwords 
aren’t changed frequently, a hacker would have plenty of time to crack the 
whole network. 
In order to avoid the risks mentioned above, a secure automation system should be 
employed in an enterprise network to manage the local administrator passwords. The 
system should provide the following benefits: 
o Changing local administrator passwords periodically and securely without a 
human intervention  
o Querying facility for technicians to learn the current local administrator password 
of a computer 
o Tracking of technicians’ querying activities 
In the scope of this study, we have designed and developed a secure automation 
system that provides the benefits mentioned above. It comprises of secure 
synchronization and query applications and protocols. It is called Enterprise-Level 
Sensitive Information Security (ESIS) system and is implemented on Windows 
platform. Details of the system are given later in this chapter. 
3.2 Overview of the System 
We propose a secure automation system, called Enterprise-Level Sensitive 
Information Security (ESIS) system, as a solution to the problems stated in the previous 
section. Local administrator passwords are very sensitive information in an enterprise 
network, but there may be other types of information as sensitive as the local 
administrator password and must be secured. Therefore, we have chosen the term, 
“Sensitive Information” in naming our system in order to cover all  types of sensitive 
information including the “local administrator password”. Although our focus is on 
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local administrator passwords,  the proposed security protocols can be easily utilized in 
exchange and synchronization of other types of sensitive information, as well. 
ESIS is a secure automation system that provides the following benefits as 
mentioned in the previous chapter: 
o Changing local administrator passwords periodically and securely without a 
human intervention  
o Querying facility for technicians to learn the current local administrator password 
of a computer 
o Tracking of technicians’ querying activities 
In the ESIS system, computers that are called ESIS Clients2 change their local 
administrator passwords in synchronization with a central server that is called ESIS 
Server3. As shown in Figure 3.1, synchronization between clients and the server is 
achieved by two protocols, ESSP (ESIS Secure Synchronization Protocol) and ECIP 
(ESSP Client Initialization Protocol). 
                                               
2 The term, “ESIS Client” is used to define a client computer in the ESIS System. The same term may be 
used for the software application running on client computers in the ESIS System throughout the text. 
3 The term, “ESIS Server” is used to define the central server that manages synchronization in the ESIS 
System. The same term may be used for  the software application running on this server  throughout the 
text. 
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Figure 3.1. Synchronization in ESIS System 
The routine synchronization messaging between the ESIS server and clients is 
performed by ESSP in a secure way. The software applications, ESIS Server application 
running on the ESIS Server and ESIS Client application running on ESIS Clients, use 
ESSP in synchronization between them. The client software application initiates ECIP 
when it is first started; synchronization with the ESIS server is initiated with this 
protocol.  
Every technician has a unique username and a password associated with this 
username and they are given tokens in which the tiny querying software application, 
ESIS Teller is located. There are also some data to be used in authentication by the 
application in this token. In order to learn the current password of an ESIS Client, a 
technician needs to authenticate himself/herself by using the querying application in the 
token. Authentication and querying operations are accomplished by a secure querying 
protocol, ESQP (ESIS Secure Querying Protocol). Authentication of a technician is a 
multi-factor authentication in which a password-username combination (What-You-
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Know type authenticator) and a token (What-You-Have type authenticator) are used 
together. Querying local administrator passwords is performed as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Querying local administrator passwords in the ESIS System 
3.3 System Components and Their Functions 
The details of the ESIS System components and their functions will be given in 
this section before delving into the details of the protocols and the applications that have 
been designed and developed in the scope of this study.  
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There are three main components of the system: the client, the server, and the 
technician. The server manages the synchronization of these local administrator 
passwords and provides tracking features. There are many clients. These are the 
computers in the network of which local administrator passwords are to be updated 
periodically. The clients run the ESIS Client Application to change their passwords 
periodically in synchronization with the server. The technician is the only user that 
interacts with the system in order to learn the current password of a particular client.  
The definition of the system components are based on their physical existences. In 
fact, there are software applications and protocols in the background, but we have 
chosen this way to be able to clearly separate the components from each other. 
3.3.1 Server 
The server, called ESIS Server, handles the following operations in the ESIS 
System: 
o Management of synchronized password generation: The clients in the system 
automatically change their local administrator passwords under the control of the 
ESIS Server. ESIS Server application communicates with the ESIS Client 
applications using the secure synchronization protocol, ESSP as depicted in 
Figure 3.1. It sends each client a different 256-bit random seed value. A client 
uses this value in generation of a new password that will be replaced with the 
current password at the time specified by the server. The details will be given 
later in this section. 
o Responding to the technician’s querying requests: An authorized technician 
can query the server to learn the current administrator password of a client. 
He/she uses a tiny (≈300kB)  software application that is called ESIS Teller 
Application and placed in his/her token in order to query the ESIS Server 
application. The protocol used between the server and the technician’s 
application is a secure protocol named ESQP which is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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o Tracking technicians’ querying activities: Since technicians must query the 
server in order to learn the current administrator password of a client computer, 
he/she needs to enter his/her username and password in the login form interface 
provided by the ESIS Teller Application. The server logs all of the queries 
performed by technicians with their usernames and the date of querying, so that 
every query made by a technician can be reported easily because every 
technician possesses a unique username. 
In the server, the following data are stored: 
o Client Data: For each client in the system, data such as client id, IP address, 
current password, and expiration time of the current password are stored. There 
are also other fields that are used in the ESIS Server Application and all of the 
parameters are shown in Table 3.1. 
o System Configuration Parameters: These are the configuration parameters for 
the ESIS Server Application, which are used to tune the system performance. 
These parameters are shown in Table 3.2. 
o Server’s RSA Public and Private Key Pair: The secure querying protocol, 
ESQP, involves public key encryption operations. An RSA public and private 
pair to be used in these operations is stored in the server. 
o Technician Accounts: Technicians’ usernames, digests of their passwords and 
token ids are stored. Authentication of the technicians using the system is 
performed by using these data. 
o Tracking Data: Technicians’ querying activities are logged by the ESIS Server 
Application. Activity data involves the client id, the technician’s username, IP 
address of the computer that the technician uses to query the server, and the 
querying date and time.  
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Client Data 
Client ID: This is a unique identifier. Two clients cannot be represented by the same 
identifier.  
IP Address:  
 
The ESIS Server uses an IP address in order to initiate the secure 
synchronization protocol, ESSP with the corresponding client. 
Current Password: All the current local administrator passwords of the clients in the system 
are stored in the server. The server changes the current password of the 
corresponding client in synchronization with the client. 
Seed:  This is a 256-bit binary sequence which is used as the symmetric 
encryption key in the secure synchronization protocol, ESSP. This value is 
updated in each successful synchronization messaging with a new seed that 
is generated by XORing a random 256-bit binary sequence with the current 
seed. 
When a new seed is sent to the client, a new synchronization is started at 
the server and the client side and the state of the client is set to 1.  
The initial value of the seed is located in each ESIS Client Application. It is 
obfuscated in the ESIS Client Application code and used in the ESIS Client 
Initialization Protocol, ESQP that will be explained in detail later in this 
chapter.  
Activation Time of the 
Synchronization:  
This is the starting time of the synchronization phase.  
Expiration Time of the 
Current Password: 
 
Current local administrator password will expire at the expiration time 
specified by this value. 
Synchronization State of 
the Client: 
An integer value represents the state of a client as follows: 
Awaiting (0): The client has changed its password and is now waiting to be 
connected and sent a new seed value to start the synchronization phase 
Aware (1): The client has been sent a seed value. 
Lost (2 or an even integer): When the server cannot send the new seed to 
the client, the state of the client is updated by incrementing the current state 
value by 2.  
Dead: The state of a particular client that cannot be synchronized for a 
specified number of times in a row becomes Dead. The server stops 
attempting to synchronize with that client. 
The state of a client that joins the network is 0. 
Number of Password 
Generation Rounds in a 
Synchronization Phase: 
After the synchronization protocol is carried out between the client and the 
server, a synchronization phase begins at the activation time specified by 
the server. In this phase, each side changes the local administrator 
password a number of times.  This number is the number of password 
generation rounds in a synchronization phase.  
Number of Remaining 
Rounds in a 
Synchronization Phase: 
As the server and the client updates the local administrator password, the 
number of the remaining rounds is decremented by one. This value is equal 
to the number of password generation rounds in the beginning of a 
synchronization phase. 
Initial Seed of a Client: As mentioned in the definition of the seed value, this value is the initial 
seed value that is obfuscated in the client application code. 
Last Synchronization 
Time: 
This is the time of the last successful update of a local administrator 
password of the client. 
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Time of Last Successful 
Sending of a Seed: 
This is the time the server has successfully finished the synchronization 
protocol. 
Time of The Next Seeding 
Attempt: 
This is the time the server starts the synchronization protocol with the 
client 
Table 3.1. ESIS Client data 
 
ESIS System Configuration Parameters 
Seeding Interval  At each seeding interval, the server application starts the synchronization 
protocol, ESSP with the client at state 0. 
Expiration Interval This is the length of the interval between password change rounds in a 
synchronization phase in seconds. 
Password Update 
Interval 
At each password update interval, the server updates the local administrator 
passwords of the clients whose corresponding expiration times are later 
than the present time. 
Password Length The generated password is at this length. 
Maximum Number of 
Seeding Attempts 
If a client cannot be reached by the client, the server tries to reach that 
client at most that number of times. If the server cannot reach a client that 
times in a row, the state of that client becomes Dead. 
Lost Client Seeding 
Interval 
If a client cannot be reached by the client, the next time the server tries to 
reach that client until that amount of time elapses. The details about the 
implementation are in Section 4.1.1.1. 
Table 3.2. ESIS System configuration parameters 
3.3.2 Client 
The client is a computer running ESIS Client Application to replace the current 
password with a different password generated by a seed value, which has been sent by 
the server, periodically and in synchronization with the server. In the client initialization 
phase, the client connects to the server in order to establish the secure initialization 
protocol. The protocol messages are encrypted with a 256-bit AES key called seedobf 
that is obfuscated in the code to prevent it from being revealed as a result of a reverse-
engineering attempt. 
The client may be disconnected from the network because of a software or 
hardware problem, which results in a broken connection between the server and the 
client. In this case, the synchronization between the server and the client halts, which 
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means the client stops changing its current password. Since the last current password of 
the client stored in the server is the valid one, the technician who has queried the server 
to learn the password can login to the client computer. 
The ESIS Client Application runs in the background on every client. This 
application is a socket application listening on a specific port to get the synchronization 
protocol packets from the server. We have implemented this application as a Windows 
service application that will be examined in Section 4.1.2. 
3.3.3 Technician 
The technician is the only user that interacts with the ESIS System as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Every technician knows/has the followings: 
o Username: Every technician is assigned a unique username. Every username is 
registered in the server.  
o Password: Each username is associated with a password. The digests of the 
passwords are stored in the server. The technician must know his/her 
username/password pair. 
o Token: To strengthen the authentication process in the secure querying protocol, 
ESQP, a token is employed together with a username and a password. Every 
technician is given a token. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this type of 
authentication is called multi-factor authentication and it is integrated in the 
system in order to increase the security level. A tiny querying software 
application, the public key of the server, and encrypted form of the digest of the 
password are located in token before it is given to a technician. Since the digest 
of the technician’s password is encrypted with the RSA private key of the server, 
a hacker cannot produce this value in order to use a different password. 
Moreover, a hacker cannot learn the password even if he/she steals a token. 
When there is a problem in one of the client computers, a technician plug his/her 
token into a computer from which the ESIS Server can be reached over the enterprise 
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network. Then, he/she uses the token application in order to connect and query the 
server to obtain the password of the client computer. In our implementation, the token is 
a USB memory stick that can be easily found in a computer store and the software 
application is a pure Win32 application which has been developed to run on Windows 
operating systems. 
3.4 Synchronized Password Generation 
Synchronized password generation takes place at the client and server sides. The 
client changes its password at the same time when the server updates the password of 
the client in the database with the new password. 
The ESIS Server controls the synchronization of local administrator passwords of 
the ESIS Clients. The synchronization between the client and the server consists of the 
following three phases: 
o ESIS Client Initialization 
o Password Synchronization Phase 
o Delivering Synchronization Parameters  
After ESIS Client Initialization, the client gets the initial synchronization 
parameters. At the time specified by the server, the password synchronization phase 
starts. After this phase has been completed by the server and the client in a synchronized 
way, the server initiates the secure synchronization protocol, ESSP, to send the 
parameters of the next synchronization password generation phase. The second and the 
third phases follow each other as shown in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. Synchronization phases 
The first phase, ESIS Client Initialization, is only initiated by the client when the 
ESIS Client Application is started. To restart the application on the client will cause the 
client to be initialized again. Therefore, a technician can restart the client application in 
order to start synchronized password generation again between the client and the server 
if a synchronization problem occurs. Since we have implemented the ESIS Client 
Application as a Windows service, it starts running automatically when the computer is 
restarted. This is a useful property because when a technician cannot login with the 
current password he/she has obtained from the server, he/she restarts the computer in 
order to establish the synchronization between the server and then queries the server for 
the local administrator password. 
The Password Synchronization Phase follows the Client Initialization and 
Delivering Synchronization Parameters phases. After the initialization of a particular 
client, password synchronization is accomplished in that client and the server after a 
specified amount of time after the server sends the synchronization parameters to that 
client. This loop as shown in Figure 3.3 lasts until the client application is restarted, 
which causes the corresponding client to be initialized. 
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In the following sections, three phases of the synchronized password generation 
and the client synchronization states will be described in detail. For the sake of clarity, 
ESIS Client Initialization and Delivering Synchronization Parameters phases will be 
explained before the Password Synchronization Phase because it depends on the 
synchronization parameters delivered to the client in those phases.  
3.4.1 Synchronization States of Client 
The clients may be in different states at different times. The state of a client that 
has just received the synchronization parameters is different from a client that has 
completed the password synchronization phase. The synchronization states are 
represented by an integer value in the server. There are four types of client 
synchronization state in the ESIS System as follows: 
o Awaiting: The clients entering the Client Initialization phase or completing the 
Password Synchronization phase are in this state. Periodically, the server sends 
the synchronization parameters to the clients that are in the Awaiting state. This 
state is represented by 0 in the database. 
o Aware: After a successful Delivering Synchronization Parameters or a Client 
Initialization phase, the synchronization state of a client becomes Aware. The 
Aware state is kept until the Password Synchronization Phase is completed by 
the server and the client. This state is represented by 1 in the database. 
o Lost: The server and a particular client cannot be synchronized successfully after 
the server initiates the secure protocol (Delivering Synchronization Parameters 
phase). This may occur because of general network errors or hardware or 
software problems in the client. In this case, the server sets the synchronization 
state of the client to the Lost state, which is represented by an even integer 
greater or equal to 2.  
o Dead: If the server cannot reach a client in the Lost state for a number of times 
that is defined as a system parameter, Maximum Number of Seeding Attempt 
Times, its state becomes Dead. The integer value representing this state is two 
times the Maximum Number of Seeding Attempt times.  
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3.4.2 ESIS Client Initialization Phase 
ESIS Client Initialization and its relation with the password synchronization phase 
is depicted in Figure 3.4. The steps in this phase are described as follows: 
o Init_ECP():  The ESIS Client joins the ESIS System, which means the ESIS 
Client Application is started on the client. As the application starts, the client 
initiates the secure initialization protocol, ECIP. 
o SendSynchParams(clientidk, seed0, tm, r, interval): The server receives the 
initialization request message that includes kth client’s id. If the server 
authenticates the client id, it sends the corresponding client the following 
synchronization parameters: 
seed0: This is the initial 256-bit pseudo-random binary sequence that will be 
used in generation of the local administrator password. This seed will be the 
symmetric encryption key in the next secure synchronization protocol, ESSP. 
The seed is generated by the server as shown below: 
                                      seed0 = seedobf  seq0  
where  is bitwise XOR operator. seedobf is a 256-bit binary sequence 
obfuscated in the client application code whereas it is stored in the database as 
the initial seed of the client. seq0 is a pseudo-random value generated by the 
server. 
tm: This is the activation time at which the password synchronization is started. 
 r: This is the number of password synchronization rounds. The local 
administrator password will be changed r times in the scope of the corresponding 
synchronization phase. 
interval: This is the duration between the synchronization phase rounds in 
seconds. 
o SendAckToServer(): If the client authenticates server’s response, it sends an 
acknowledgement message to the server.  
o SetState(clientidk,1): If The server receives the acknowledgement message and 
authenticates it successfully, it updates the state of the client to Aware state (1) 
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in the database, which means the client has been sent synchronization 
parameters and is ready for the synchronization phase. 
 
Figure 3.4. Password synchronization after ESIS Client Initialization 
This phase depends on the secure client initialization protocol, ECIP and it will be 
given later in this chapter.  
3.4.3 Delivering Synchronization Parameters Phase  
This phase is initiated by the server and depends on the secure synchronization 
protocol, ESSP that will be explained later in this chapter. 
The Password Synchronization Phase follows this phase as shown in Figure 3.3 
and the relation between them is shown in Figure 3.5.  
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Figure 3.5. Password synchronization after Delivering Synchronization Parameters 
The synchronization parameters that are sent to the client in this phase are the 
same with those sent in the client initialization phase, but it is initiated by the server 
whereas the client initialization phase is initiated by the client. In this phase, the server 
generates the seed value that will be used in the ith synchronization phase, which is 
calculated as follows.  
seedi = seedi-1   seqi  
 
where  is bitwise XOR operator, and seqi is a pseudo-random value. 
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3.4.4 Password Synchronization Phase 
In the first and the third phases, the server sends the synchronization parameters to 
the client. Since the client and the server know the parameters, the generated password 
in this phase becomes the same at both sides.  
The password synchronization phase comprises one or more rounds as shown in 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. The server sends the number of rounds to the client among 
the synchronization parameters. In these rounds, the server and the client perform the 
following operations as shown in Figure 3.5: 
o Gen_Rpl_Pwd(seedi, pwdi,j): The client replaces its current local administrator 
password with the new one generated by this function. The new password is 
generated as follows: 
pwdi,j+1 = pwdi,j+1  seedi   
o Gen_Upd_Pwd(seedi, pwdi,j, clientidk): The new password is generated in the 
same way as in the function, Gen_Rpl_Pwd. The server updates the local 
administrator password of the client in the database and also sets the state of the 
corresponding client to the Awaiting state (0).  
The password synchronization starts at the activation time, tm as shown in Figure 
3.5. Therefore, system clock of all the clients and the server must be synchronized in 
order to establish synchronization in the ESIS System. In an enterprise network, this can 
be achieved by providing a time synchronization service. If this service fails, the 
password synchronization in the ESIS System will fail accordingly. Hence, this service 
should be robust and scalable.  
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3.5 Protocols 
The building blocks of a secure authentication system are carefully designed and 
flawless security protocols. The ESIS System comprises of three protocols, ESIS Secure 
Synchronization Protocol (ESSP), ESIS Secure Querying Protocol (ESQP), and ESIS 
Client Initialization Protocol (ECIP).  The local administrator password synchronization 
between the server and the clients depends on the ESSP and the ECIP as shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
In Section 3.5.1, all of the abbreviations used in the protocol definitions are 
explained. In Sections 3.5.2, 3.5.3, and 3.5.4, the secure protocols employed in the ESIS 
System are explained in detail.  
3.5.1 Abbreviations 
The following list of abbreviations are used in the protocols. 
T: Technician 
C: Client computer 
un: Technician’s user name 
pwdtechnician: The password that the technician enters in the software. 
h(pwdtoken): The hashed form of the password which is located the technician’s token.  
TS: A timestamp value used in the protocols in order to thwart replay attacks4 on them. 
Ek: The symmetric key encryption routine using an AES key k. 
HMACkey: The message authentication routine using a symmetric key 
tid: Token Id 
                                                
4 A hacker can intercept an encrypted message in order to send it to the destination later for unauthorized 
access. This type of an attack is called replay attack. 
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Epub: The RSA public key encryption routine of the server using its public key. 
Epriv: The RSA private key encryption routine of the server using its private key. 
compName: The name of the client computer whose password is requested. (Example: 
abc.companydomain.com) 
locAdmPwd: Current local administrator password of a client. The technician needs the 
current local administrator password of a client in order to login to it. 
nextSeed: The seed value that will be used in the next numberOfRounds password 
generations.  
activationTime: The starting time of a password synchronization phase. 
numberOfRounds: The number of rounds of a password synchronization phase. 
interval: The time in seconds between the rounds in a password synchronization phase. 
clientID: An identifier string that uniquely identifies the computer in the network. This 
could be the same as the computer name such as abc.companydomain.com.   
seedobf: A 256-bit binary sequence which is obfuscated in the ESIS Client Application 
code and stored in the server. This is employed as the symmetric key in the client 
initialization protocol, ECIP. 
Kses: A symmetric key used during a session between two communicating parties (a 
session key). 
Eses: The symmetric key encryption routine using the session key Kses. 
3.5.2 ESIS Client Initialization Protocol (ECIP) 
Due to the various network or hardware problems, a client can disconnect from 
the network causing that the server cannot reach the client and cannot initiate the 
synchronization protocol (ESSP) with the client. The server attempts to reach the client 
for several times but after a specified number of times, the server stops attempting to 
reach and initiate the ESSP with the client. In this case, if the client service application 
is started at the client side, this client will never be contacted by the server because it’s 
known as dead by the server. Therefore, the client needs to initiate another protocol to 
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establish the synchronization again. This protocol is the ESIS Client Initialization 
Protocol. The client service application initiates this protocol whenever it is started. In 
fact, this protocol can also be used as a notification protocol, which means that client 
has joined the network as shown in Figure 3.1 . The protocol is as follows: 
1. C → S: HMACseedobf(clientId,TS) , clientId , TS 
2. S → C: Eseedobf (M1) , HMACseedobf (M1) 
3. C → S: HMACseedobf (M2) 
In the first step, the client authenticates itself by sending its client id, a timestamp 
value, and the authentication code of the whole message. seedobf is used as the 
symmetric key in HMAC and AES encryption operations.  
As a result of successful authentication of the client, the server prepares the 
message M1 including the synchronization parameters. M1 is as follows: 
 M1 = TS, nextSeed, activationTime, clientID, numberOfRounds, interval 
The synchronization parameters nextSeed, activationTime, numberOfRounds, and 
interval are explained in Section 3.4.2. The timestamp, TS is put in the messages in 
order to thwart replay attacks. Binding the message to the time prevents a hacker from 
using the same message later for unauthorized access. Later, the server refuses the 
message because of its invalid timestamp. The server encrypts the message and 
generates authentication code of the message by using the client’s seedobf as the 
symmetric key. The server sends the encrypted message and the message authentication 
code to the client in the second step of the protocol. Encryption and computing the 
message authentication code provide confidentiality and authentication of the message. 
After the client receives and authenticates M1, the client prepares the 
acknowledgement message, M2 in order to send to the server. The client becomes ready 
for the password synchronization phase as shown in Figure 3.4. M2 is as follows: 
M2 = TS+1, nextSeed, activationTime, clientID, numberOfRounds, interval 
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Since the server knows how M2 is computed and the symmetric key, it can 
authenticate the message. On the other hand, M1 may also be used as the 
acknowledgement message but in this case, a hacker can obtain it in the second step of 
the protocol and use it to pretend like the client. Therefore, to differentiate the 
acknowledgement message, timestamp in M1 is incremented. A hacker cannot replay 
this message because the encryption key, seedobf is just known to the client and the 
server. If the server authenticates M2, it sets the state of the client to the Aware state and 
updates the synchronization data of the corresponding client.  
3.5.3 ESIS Secure Synchronization Protocol (ESSP) 
As shown in Figure 3.5, the server delivers the synchronization parameters to the 
clients using the secure synchronization protocol, ESSP.  
The synchronization protocol involves two steps: 
1. S → C: Eseed(M1) , HMACseed(M1) 
2. C → S: HMACseed(M2) 
Steps of the protocol are the same as the second and third steps of the client 
initialization protocol, ECIP. The contents of M1 and M2 are given in Section 3.5.2.  
In the first step of the protocol, the server sends the synchronization parameters to 
the client in the Awaiting state. The server encrypts the message, M1, including the 
synchronization parameters and obtains the message authentication code of M1. The 
symmetric key used in encryption and message authentication function is the current 
seed value that is known to both client and server. M1 is as follows: 
 M1 = TS, nextSeed, activationTime, clientID, numberOfRounds, interval 
The client decrypts the ciphertext in order to get M1 before computing its message 
authentication code. It authenticates the server by comparing the message authentication 
codes, the computed one and the other sent in the first step of the protocol. After a 
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successful authentication, the client sends the message authentication code of M2 as an 
acknowledgement message. M2 is as follows: 
M2 = TS+1, nextSeed, activationTime, clientID, numberOfRounds, interval 
Practically, the message authentication code of M1 may be sent to the server as the 
acknowledgement message allowing a hacker to pretend like the client because he/she 
can obtain it in the previous (first) step of the protocol. Hence, another practical but a 
secure way is to increment the timestamp in M1 in order to get M2. Since the current 
seed is just known to the client and the server, the message authentication code of M2 
cannot be replayed by an attacker. Afterwards, the server sets the state of the client to 
the Aware state and updates the synchronization data of the corresponding client if it 
authenticates the client in the second step of the protocol. 
The size of the encrypted message is 128 bytes whereas the size of the message 
authentication code is 20 bytes. Since there are two message authentication codes and 
one encrypted message sent in the protocol, the total size of the messages exchanged 
between the participants is 168 bytes (1344 bits).  
3.5.4 ESIS Secure Querying Protocol (ESQP) 
Technicians can query the server with the application located in their tokens. The 
messaging between the token application and the server application is performed by the 
secure querying protocol, ESQP as shown in Figure 3.2. The protocol ESQP consists of 
the following steps: 
1.  T → C: Epub(un, pwdtechnician, TS, Kses, tid) , Epriv(h(pwdtoken)) 
2.  C → T: Eses(TS) 
3.  T → C: Eses(compName, TS) 
4.  C → T: Eses(locAdmPwd,TS,compName,expirationTime) 
5.  T → C: Eses(“kill”, TS) 
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The first step is the authentication or identification of the technician. The 
technician's username, timestamp value, token ID and a session key generated by the 
token application is encrypted with the public key of the server and then this encrypted 
message is sent to the server with the technician's password that is signed by the server's 
private key. The technician is authenticated when the two conditions are met: 
1. Epub(Epriv(h(pwdtoken))  h(pwdtechnician) 
2. h(pwdtechnician)  GetPassword(un, tid) 
where GetPassword(un, tid) is a function which returns the password associated 
with the username and token id which are stored in the database on the server. 
If the first condition is satisfied, it is verified that the password digitally signed 
and embedded in the token and the one the technician uses are same. The digital 
signature of the password is embedded into the token by a system administrator that has 
privilege to use the private key of the server before it is given to a technician. Since 
nobody except the system administrator can reproduce the signature of the password 
without the knowledge of the private key, the first condition provides the server the 
ability to control the identity binding between the token and the technician. The 
technician may quit his/her job without giving his/her token back to the system 
administrator, but he/she must be prevented from using the system. This need can be 
satisfied by the second condition. If the system administrator changes the technician’s 
password or even deletes his/her entry from the database, the second condition fails and 
the technician is not authenticated. 
The second step of the protocol is the identification of the server. In the second 
step the server encrypts the timestamp with the session key and sends it back. Since no 
one knows the session key, the encrypted message itself is an adequate indicator for the 
technician that the server has received the message and is the owner of the message. 
After the authentication phase (steps 1 and 2) is completed, the technician now 
can query the server to obtain passwords of the computers. In the third step, the 
technician requests the password of a client computer from the server. The 
corresponding computer name is sent to the server together with the timestamp. The 
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server receives the ciphertext and decrypts it in order to get the computer name and the 
timestamp. Since successful decryption provides authentication as well as 
confidentiality, the server can authenticate the message by decrypting it successfully. As 
a result of this request, the server finds the current password of the client computer from 
the database.  
The fourth step of the protocol is the secure password transfer. The server sends 
the current local administrator password, the corresponding computer name, the 
timestamp value and the expiration time of the password in an encrypted form after it 
encrypts them by using the session key. The technician receives and authenticates the 
message by decrypting it.  
The technician can use the current local administrator password of the computer 
until the expiration time; otherwise, he/she must query the server again in order to get 
the new current local administrator password and its expiration time. Moreover, the 
technician may need the current local administrator passwords of some other computers. 
Since the technician is already authenticated in the first and the second steps of the 
protocol, there is no need to repeat these steps in each query. So, only the third and the 
fourth steps are repeated through the session. Since the timestamp is put in the 
encrypted message, a hacker cannot perform a replay attack in order to get a response 
from the server. A session is closed automatically by the server after a period of time 
(Ex: 20 min.) in which the technician stays inactive or after a total amount of session 
time (Ex: 60 min.). 
The technician may need to close the session whenever he wants after the fourth 
step. The fifth step is to deliberately close the session. The technician sends a “kill” 
command in an encrypted form. If the server decrypts the encrypted message 
successfully, it authenticates the message and closes the session. As in the previous 
steps, the timestamp is also sent together with the command in order to prevent replay 
attacks so that a hacker cannot close a session without knowing the session key. When 
the session is closed, the server updates the session record on the database. 
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3.6 Discussion 
The security of the system depends not only on the secure protocols but also on 
the implementation details. Some open issues need to be addressed in the 
implementation in order to fill the security gaps of the system.  
A real problem that may occur in the implementation is that the technician can 
close the client service application because he/she logs into the computer using the 
administrator password. Afterwards, he/she can even change the local administrator 
password. This problem may be observed by examining the relationship between the 
time when a client gets to the Dead state and the time when a technician queries the 
server for the local administrator password of that client. If they are very close to each 
other, this may be a clue showing that the technician has closed the service application. 
Another issue is that the technician may give his/her token, user name, and 
password to a third person. Giving all the authenticators to the third person allows 
him/her to use the ESIS System. This situation may be observed by analyzing the log 
data of the technicians’ querying activities. If there are illogical entries in the log data 
such that a technician username and password might have been used at almost the same 
time but at different places, this shows a third person possesses technician’s 
authenticators. This situation may be handled up to an extent by changing technicians’ 
passwords frequently, so that the third person cannot use the system for a long time. 
However, since the content of the token must be updated when its owner’s password is 
changed, there is a need for a practical method in order to update the tokens in a 
frequently manner.  
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4 APPLICATION 
A set of software applications have been developed in the scope of this study: 
o A server application, ESIS Server 
o A Windows service, ESIS Client 
o A Windows console application, ESIS Teller 
 
In the following sections, these applications will be explained in detail. 
4.1.1 The ESIS Server 
ESIS Server has been developed in Visual Basic.NET to run on Microsoft.NET 
Framework. Microsoft.NET Framework is an application platform that runs on 
Windows based systems. The RDBMS has been chosen as MS SQL Server 2000. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, the server application consists of four concurrent threads; 
synchronization, password update, client initialization, and password query. 
The ESIS Server Application has been developed as a Windows service 
application. Therefore, there is no need to start the application each time the server is 
restarted. Starting the service is the initialization of the application that results in 
starting the threads whereas stopping the service causes the threads to be stopped and 
destroyed. 
In the Synchronization Thread, the server initiates the secure querying protocol, 
ESSP with the clients. The server updates the local administrator passwords of the 
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clients in the Password Update Thread. The Client Initialization Thread handles the 
client initialization requests that the clients send in order to be synchronized with the 
server. The Password Query Thread handles technicians’ query requests securely using 
the secure querying protocol, ESQP.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. ESIS Server Statechart 
4.1.1.1 Synchronization Thread 
The Synchronization Thread handles delivering the synchronization parameters to 
the clients and performing the necessary actions after. The synchronization parameters 
are detailed in 3.4.  
The server obtains the data of the clients that are in the Awaiting and the Lost 
states in order to send them the synchronization parameters.  
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Successful synchronization. This thread initiates the secure synchronization 
protocol, ESSP. If the protocol is performed successfully, the state of the client is set to 
the Aware state and the expiration time of the corresponding client is set to a specified 
time later than the present time as follows: 
state(k) := 1  
expirationTime(k) := NOW() + expirationTimeInterval 
The expirationTimeInterval shown in the above pseudo-code is the system 
parameter, Expiration Time Interval and should be very carefully selected in order to 
keep the system working correctly.  
Unsuccessful synchronization. The synchronization protocol may fail due to a 
general network error or misconfiguration in the client. The server performs the 
following pseudo-code when the synchronization protocol fails: 
state(k) := state(k) + 2 
The state of the client is set to the Lost state. This state is represented by an even 
integer greater or equal to 2 as shown above. The server attempts to reach a client in the 
Lost state for a number of times that is defined as the system parameter, Maximum 
Number of Seeding Attempts. For example, if this parameter is set to 10, the maximum 
value of a synchronization state of  a client will be 20, which means the server could not 
send the synchronization parameters successfully to the client for 10 times in a row and 
has stopped attempting to reach it resulting in the state shift from Lost to Dead. This 
notion is useful because to divide the state value by 2 gives the number of unsuccessful 
synchronization attempts in a row between the server and the client. 
If the system parameter, Seeding Interval is set to a large value like 12 hours,    
the unreachable clients will not be contacted until this amount of time elapses. So, 
another parameter is employed in the case of unsuccessful synchronization as follows:  
nextSeedAttemptTime := NOW() + lostClientSeedInterval * state(k) 
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The system parameter, Lost Client Seeding Interval, is added to the present time 
after it is multiplied with the state of the client. This value is kept smaller than the seed 
interval, so that the clients in the Lost state can be synchronized earlier. The increasing 
value of a state indicates the high possibility of being a crucial problem in the client 
instead of a network problem and it is meaningless to attempt to reach it. Therefore, in 
order to increase the system performance, this parameter is multiplied with the state 
resulting in the increasing durations between the synchronization attempt times. 
The thread is paused for a number of seconds that is defined as the system 
parameter, Seeding Interval following the delivering synchronization parameters to 
clients. The Seeding Interval is a significant parameter that can be used in performance 
optimization. 
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Figure 4.2. ESIS Synchronization Thread Statechart
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4.1.1.2 Password Update Thread 
This thread handles the Password Synchronization Phase that is detailed in 3.4.4 
at the server side. 
ESIS Server periodically looks up in the database to find out the clients that are in 
the Aware state and have an expiration time value greater than or equal to the present 
time. This thread simply updates the local administrator password fields of those 
clients’ database records with the newly generated ones. A new local administrator 
password is generated by a password generator routine that uses the current seed and the 
current local administrator password of the client. The same password generator routine 
is used by the service application at the client side which is as follows: 
PWDnew := PWDcurrent  SEEDcurrent 
where  is bitwise XOR operator. 
While updating the local administrator password of a client, its state is also set to 
the Awaiting state if all of the rounds in the synchronization phase are finished. 
Therefore, it will be sent the new synchronization parameters for the next 
synchronization phase.  
When the update operation is completed, the thread pauses for a number of 
seconds that is defined as the system parameter, Password Update Interval.  
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 Figure 4.3. ESIS Server Password Update Thread Statechart 
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4.1.1.3 Client Initialization Thread 
The server application listens on a specific port for client initialization requests in 
the Client Initialization Thread and it handles all of them. When the client service 
application is started, it initiates the client initialization protocol, ECIP in order to 
initialize itself and join the ESIS System.  
The statechart of this thread is depicted in Figure 4.4. As shown in the figure, the 
result of the client initialization protocol is handled the same way as it is described in 
Section 4.1.1.1 where the Synchronization Thread is detailed. 
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Figure 4.4. ESIS Server Client Initialization Thread Statechart 
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4.1.1.4 Password Query Thread 
Technicians can query the server by using their tiny Win325 applications located 
on their tokens. The communication between the server and the token application is 
handled by the password query thread, which means that the ESQP is handled by this 
thread as shown in Figure 4.5. 
When a token application connects to the server, it initiates the secure querying 
protocol (ESQP). The technician sends his password and username as well as the digital 
signature of his password located in the token. As you will remember, when the 
following conditions are met, the technician gets authenticated and can query the server.  
1. Epub(Epriv(h(pwdtoken)) = h(pwdtechnician) 
2. h(pwdtechnician) = GetPassword(un, tid) 
The first condition guarantees that the technician is the real owner of the token 
because he cannot locate Epriv(h(pwdtoken) in the token without the knowledge of the 
server private key. Server decrypts the message using its private RSA key and compares 
it with the digest of technician’s password. If they are the same, it can be trusted that the 
token belongs to the technician. 
The second condition guarantees that technician’s password is correct or he is still 
employed. GetPassword() is a function which returns the password associated with the 
username and token id which are stored in the database on the server.  If the technician 
quits his job, to change or to delete the username and password entry associated with 
him from the database is adequate to restrict his access to the system.   
                                                
5 Win32 applications are developed using the Win32 Application Programming Interface (Win32 API) 
provided by the Windows Operation System resulting in smaller and more portable applications. 
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Figure 4.5. ESIS Password Query Thread Statechart
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4.1.2 ESIS Client 
ESIS Client has been developed in the C programming language. It is compatible 
with many of the Windows platforms6.  ESIS Client is a Windows service application. 
In Windows operating systems, a service is an application that continuously runs in the 
background. The Unix name for a Windows service equivalent is daemon. The purpose 
of developing the client application as a Windows service is to eliminate the need to 
user-interaction to start the program. As the client computer starts, the service 
application starts automatically.  In Figure 4.6, the statechart of the ESIS Client service 
application is depicted. 
In the initialization step, the client initiates the client initialization protocol, ECIP. 
The client constantly initiates the protocol until it can authenticate itself to the server 
and establish synchronization by performing the rest of the protocol. If the protocol is 
completed successfully, the client gets the synchronization parameters in order to 
change its local administrator passwords at the given time.  
The client waits for the activation time to change its current local administrator 
password. Since the number of rounds in a synchronization phase is one in our 
implementation, after the activation (replacing password with the newly generated one), 
the  client starts listening on a specified socket and waits for the server to start the 
synchronization protocol, ESSP. The server connects to the client and starts the ESSP. If 
synchronization is successful, the client again waits for the activation time to change its 
current local administrator password, otherwise it keeps on listening on the specified 
port for the next ESSP session. 
                                                
6 Windows NT 4, Windows 2000, Windows XP 
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Figure 4.6. ESIS Client Statechart 
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5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Various parameters affect the performance of the system. Some of these 
parameters are configurable; some of them are not. In Section 3.3.1, the list of 
configurable system parameters are presented, which are also listed below. We have 
used the parameters in Table 5.1 in our simulations in order to evaluate the performance 
of the system. 
Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Descripton: 
n Number of clients This is the number of clients in the ESIS System. 
texp Expiration Interval The server application uses the expiration interval 
in order to calculate the next activation time of the 
client by adding it to the present time before it 
sends the synchronization parameters to the client. 
ts Seeding Interval The duration between the synchronization phases 
initiated by the server is specified by this system 
parameter. 
 tlcs Lost Client Seeding Interval As a result of an unsuccessful synchronization 
phase, the corresponding client is contacted with 
the server after an amount of time specified by 
this parameter. 
m Maximum Number of Seeding Attempts The server stops attempting to initiate the ESSP 
with a client after that number of attempts. 
 Ps Synchronization Success Probability The probability of success of a single run of the 
synchronization protocol is defined by this 
parameter. 
Table 5.1. Simulation Parameters 
We have examined the secure querying protocol, ESSP in the simulations. The 
ESSP is the main and the most important component of the system. Almost all of the 
synchronization is carried out by the ESSP. Other protocols are used rarely in the 
system. Therefore, focusing on the ESSP in order to evaluate the performance is a valid 
approach. 
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5.1 Assumptions and Constant Parameters 
 In the implementation of the system, the Password Synchronization Phase 
consists of one round as mentioned in 4.1.2, so does in the simulation. The network 
bandwidth is constant at 100 Kbit/sec. The total size of the packets used in the ESSP as 
shown in Section 3.5.3 is 1324 bits. The total processing time of the protocol is 0.1 
seconds.  This value has been computed with a server and a client that have the same 
configuration of Pentium Celeron 1333 MHz processor and 512 MB Ram. Therefore, 
the total amount of time passing in an ESSP session between a client and a server, tessp is 
as follows: 
tessp = 1324 / (100 * 1024) + 0.1 ≈ 0.13 sec 
All of the simulations are performed for 20 days, which we believe is sufficient to 
show the system behavior correctly. The initial synchronization time of the clients are 
randomly distributed within the first day.  
5.2 Tuning Expiration Interval 
The server application as explained in Section 4.1.1 uses the expiration interval in 
order to calculate the next activation time of the client before it sends the 
synchronization parameters. This value is added to the present time and sent to the 
client. Setting this parameter to a large value results in the small number of 
synchronizations. 
Eight cases are examined, in which the expiration interval is configured as 1, 2, 3, 
6, 12, and 24 hours, respectively. Same values have been used for the other parameters 
as shown in Table 5.2. 
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Parameter Value 
n 3,000 
ts 1 hour 
tlcs 15 min 
m 5 
Ps 0.9 
Table 5.2. Simulation parameters used in tuning expiration interval 
The next time a client should be synchronized gets earlier as the expiration 
interval is shortened, so that the total number of synchronization attempts made in the 
simulation time of 20 days increases naturally. Decreasing the expiration interval to a 
lower value results in increasing number of synchronization attempts as shown in Table 
5.3 and Figure 5.1.  
Number of Synchronization Attempts 
texp 
Successful Failed Total 
1 hours 1271466 133987 1405453 
2 hours 656849 72640 729489 
3 hours 453563 47437 501000 
6 hours 231,538 23,892 255,430 
12 hours 117,587 12,291 129,878 
24 hours 59,732 6,596 66,328 
Table 5.3. Number of synchronization attempts due to texp 
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Figure 5.1. Number of synchronization attempts due to texp 
The high number of the clients in the Awaiting state indicates high number of 
synchronization attempts. In Figure 5.2, Figure 5.4, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.8, Figure 5.10, 
and Figure 5.12, the number of Awaiting clients are shown due the varying texp. In the 
figures, the hours in the twenty-day simulation are located in the X axis whereas the 
number of awaiting clients are located in the Y axis. 
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Figure 5.2. Tuning expiration interval to 1 hour (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.3. Tuning expiration interval to 1 hour (1-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.4. Tuning expiration interval to 2 hours (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.5. Tuning expiration interval to 2 hours (1-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.6. Tuning expiration interval to 3 hours (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.7. Tuning expiration interval to 3 hours (1-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.8. Tuning expiration interval to 6 hours (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.9. Tuning expiration interval to 6 hours (1-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.10. Tuning expiration interval to 12 hours (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.11. Tuning expiration interval to 12 hours (1-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.12. Tuning expiration interval to 24 hours (20-day period is plotted) 
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Figure 5.13. Tuning expiration interval to 24 hours (1-day period is plotted) 
After the state of a particular client becomes Awaiting, this client becomes ready 
to be synchronized. Moreover, to increase the expiration interval causes a client that is 
synchronized to be in the Aware state for a long time. Therefore, setting the expiration 
interval to 24 hours decreases the number of clients that are in the Awaiting state per 
hour as shown in  Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13. If a synchronization attempts fails, it is 
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repeated but earlier because the lost client seeding interval is smaller than the seeding 
interval. Therefore, the number of clients in the awaiting state decreases in some hours 
as shown in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.8, Figure 5.10, and Figure 5.12, meaning 
that these clients will be contacted again because of the previous unsuccessful 
synchronization attempt . 
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Figure 5.14. The average of successful synchronizations per client 
In an enterprise network, there may be more than 3,000 computers. We have 
simulated our system for networks consisting of 3,000, 10,000, and 20,000 computers 
and obtained the results in Table 5.4. 
Avg. Successful 
Synchronizations texp 
n=3,000 n=10,000 n=20,000 
1 h 423.8 423.2 423.6 
6 h 77.13 77.06 77.14 
12 h 39.14 39.14 39.12 
24 h 19.91 19.90 19.90 
Table 5.4. The Average of successful synchronizations per client in different-sized 
Networks  
Decreasing the length of the expiration interval increases the number of 
synchronization attempts made by the server as expected. The average of the number of 
successful synchronizations per client stays constant in different-sized networks as 
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shown in Table 5.4. Scalability of the system can be defined as the direct proportion 
between the number of clients and the average of successful synchronizations per client. 
Therefore, the system can be scaled up to a higher number of clients if the parameters 
are configured correctly. 
5.3 Tuning Seeding Interval 
The duration between the synchronization phases initiated by the server is 
specified by a system parameter, Seeding Interval. In the simulations, we have 
examined this parameter by setting it to 1, 6 and 12 hours while the other parameters 
have been set as shown in Table 5.5. 
Parameter Value 
n 1,000 
texp 12 hours 
tlcs 15 min 
m 5 
Ps 0.9 
Table 5.5. Simulation parameters used in tuning seeding interval 
The simulation has yielded the results in Table 5.6. The number of successful 
synchronizations between the clients and the server decreases as the length of the 
seeding interval increases. 
Number of Synchronization Attempts 
ts 
Successful Failed Total 
1 hour 391,428 41,901 433,329 
6 hours 374,885 40,325 415,210 
12 hours 356,545 38,457 395,002 
Table 5.6. Number of synchronization attempts due to ts (seeding interval) 
In Figure 5.15, Figure 5.16, and Figure 5.17, the number of awaiting clients per 
hour in the beginning of the timeline is nearly constant because the initial 
synchronization times of the clients are assigned by the simulation program. As shown 
  72 
in Figure 5.15, the synchronization attempts can be evenly distributed over the timeline 
by configuring the seeding interval to 1 hour instead of  6 or 12 hours. As shown in 
Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17, to enlarge the interval causes the synchronization attempts 
to be split over a few number of points in the timeline, which may result in performance 
bottlenecks in the server.  Therefore, distributing synchronization attempts smoothly in 
the time and avoiding performance bottlenecks can be achieved just by shortening the 
seeding intervals. 
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Figure 5.15. Tuning seeding interval to 1 hour 
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Figure 5.16. Tuning seeding interval to 6 hours 
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Figure 5.17. Tuning seeding interval to 12 hours 
In the previous simulations mentioned above, the seeding interval is configured as 
1, 6, and 12 hours that are relatively big values. In order to analyze the effect of smaller 
seeding intervals, we have run the simulations for 2 days (48 hours) and set the seeding 
interval to 10, 15, 30, and 60 seconds while keeping the expiration interval as 1 hour.  
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As shown in Table 5.7, the total numbers of synchronization attempts in each run 
are very close to each other. Therefore, the seeding interval can be configured as a very 
small value. In addition, the distribution of the synchronization attempts over time (one 
hour period) can be seen in Figure 5.18, Figure 5.19, Figure 5.20, and Figure 5.21.  
Number of Synchronization Attempts 
ts 
Successful Failed Total 
10 seconds 36,399 3,661 40,060 
15 seconds 36,467 3,931 40,398 
30 seconds 36,186 4,307 40,493 
60 seconds 35,825 3,239 39,064 
Table 5.7. Number of synchronization attempts due to smaller ts (seeding interval) 
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Figure 5.18. Tuning seeding interval to 10 seconds 
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Figure 5.19. Tuning seeding interval to 15 seconds 
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Figure 5.20. Tuning seeding interval to 30 seconds 
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Figure 5.21. Tuning seeding interval to 60 seconds 
The simulation results show that the seeding interval is not a very critical 
parameter in tuning the system performance because it does not affect the total number 
of synchronizations when it is changed. However, the system administrator can control 
the distribution of the synchronization attempts over time. This feature leads to a more 
controlled system. 
5.4 Tuning  Maximum Number of Seeding Attempts 
The server stops attempting to initiate the ESSP with a client after a certain 
amount of unsuccessful attempts. This number is specified by a system parameter, 
Maximum Number of Seeding Attempts. Unsuccessful seeding may occur because of 
the general network errors. It is vital to configure this parameter correctly. This notion is 
integrated into the model by using a parameter that defines the probability of success of 
a single run of the synchronization protocol, Ps.   
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The probability of considering a client in the Dead state, Pdead, is calculated as 
follows: 
Pdead =  (1-Ps)m 
In the equation above, m is the maximum number of seeding attempts. Increasing 
the value of m increases the probability of success, but also causes the server to initiate 
the synchronization protocol much more times. Therefore, configuring this parameter to 
a higher value makes the system more robust but creates much more network traffic. On 
the other hand, decreasing its value results in dead clients that are in fact running 
smoothly. The simulation parameters as shown in Table 5.8 describes this relation very 
clearly as it is shown in Figure 5.22. 
Parameter Value 
n 10,000 
ts 1 hour 
texp 12 hours 
m 1, 3, and 7 
Ps 0.5 
Table 5.8. Simulation parameters used in tuning maximum number of seeding intervals 
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Figure 5.22. Tuning maximum number of seeding intervals  
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When m is set to 1, the number of Awaiting clients decreases to zero at the 145th 
hour. In case of two failing synchronization attempts with a client in a row, which has 
the probability of 0.5, the state of the client is set to Dead. Therefore, in each 
synchronization phase, the server will stop synchronization with the 50% of the clients 
as expected. As a result, it is shown that the system cannot survive when m is set to 1 
and stops functioning after a while. However, setting m to 3, in our case, doesn’t 
prevent the system from losing synchronization with the clients, but it makes the system 
to stand for 480 hours. Ultimately, m is set to 7, which results in a more tolerant system 
and at the end of the simulation for twenty days, the synchronization is still being 
provided. However, increasing the maximum number of synchronization attempts 
increases the network traffic dramatically as shown in Table 5.9. Since the server 
attempts to reach a lost client more times, as the maximum number of synchronization 
attempts is increased, the increase in network traffic is an expected result. 
 
Number of Synchronization Attempts 
m 
Successful Failed Total 
1 10,597 10,000 20,597 
3 80,230 76,173 156,403 
7 319,747 313,491 633,238 
Table 5.9. Number of synchronization attempts due to m (maximum number of 
synchronization attempts) 
  79 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we have designed and developed a secure synchronization and 
querying system, called ESIS. We have also developed a set of application prototypes in 
order to implement the solutions we propose. 
Synchronized password generation prevents local administrator passwords from 
being compromised because of their limited validities. The secure protocols that 
constitute the base of the ESIS System depend on the powerful cryptographic 
algorithms. However, just a secure system lacking performance, scalability, and 
robustness has no room in the real world. The ESIS System provides scalability and 
robustness as well as the optimum performance under varying circumstances. 
The system provides a secure querying facility to be used by technicians. The 
multi-factor authentication (token and username and password combination) employed 
in the secure querying protocol brings the following benefits: 
o A technician cannot give his token to somebody in order to let him/her 
compromise the system because then, he/she cannot authenticate himself/herself.  
o If a token is lost, it cannot be exploited and used without the knowledge of the 
corresponding username and password. 
o If a technician loses his/her token, he/she can notice this situation immediately 
and take some precautions. 
In order to improve the performance of the system, the system parameters should 
be configured very carefully. We have focused on tuning the expiration interval, the 
seeding  interval and the maximum number of seeding attempts and obtained the 
following results: 
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o Shortening the expiration interval increases the number of synchronization 
attempts made by the server as expected. Therefore, configuring this parameter 
to a relatively small value should be avoided in order to keep the network traffic 
low.  
o The aim is to keep the average number of the successful synchronizations per 
client at a constant number. This can be achieved in the ESIS System. 
o The synchronization attempts can be distributed evenly or in pieces over the time 
by configuring the seeding interval.  
o The probability of failure of a synchronization attempt increases as the quality of 
the network infrastructure decreases, which results in the increasing number of 
unreachable clients. Configuring maximum number of synchronization attempts 
to a relatively big value prevents the clients from shifting to the dead state, 
which in fact are in the awaiting mode and cannot be reached because of the 
general network errors. However, setting this parameter to a big value increases 
the network traffic. Therefore, there is a trade-off here and an extra care should 
be given in tuning this parameter. In the simulations, setting this parameter to 7 
has given a satisfactory output under certain circumstances where the probability 
of success of a synchronization attempt is 0.5. 
The proposed system provides significant benefits. However, there are some open 
issues that should be resolved. One of these issues is the deployment of the client 
application. Since seedobf is used as the symmetric key in the initialization of a client, it 
should be different on each client. To obfuscate different seed values, the application 
code needs to be re-compiled for each seed, which results in different binaries. 
Therefore, a different application should be installed to each client, which is very hard 
to handle in an enterprise network. Management and deployment of client applications 
should be make practical in order to make the system acceptable for the organizations.   
Another issue is the problem of generating tokens. A technician’s token stores the 
encrypted form of his/her password digest. The digest is encrypted with the RSA private 
key of the server. If the private key or the technician’s passwords is changed, the token 
must be updated. It is easy to update or to generate tokens in a central place. However, 
an enterprise network may be formed of subnetworks that may be geographically 
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separated, so that a central place for managing the tokens is not very practical. 
Therefore, a flexible solution for management of tokens is needed. 
Yet another issue is the availability of the ESIS Server. If the server crashes or 
becomes disconnected, the password synchronization stops between the clients and the 
server. To overcome this problem, one or more servers can be employed additionally as 
ESIS Servers. 
To sum up, we have designed and developed a prototype for a secure password 
synchronization and querying system. As the problems discussed above are resolved, 
the system will be a superior candidate to be implemented in a real enterprise network. 
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APPENDIX A 
Screenshots of the applications 
 
Technician’s querying application 
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Client Service Application in the Windows Services Pane 
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ESIS Server Application in the Windows Services Pane 
 
The ESIS Client Data on the MS SQL Server Database 
 
The ESIS Configuration Data on the MS SQL Server Database 
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The Client Service Application Log File 
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